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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ADMIRALTY SYMPOSIUM

FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN ADMIRALTY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE BEGINNING OF AN EXCHANGE

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
Most scholars and practitioners of admiralty law have long relied upon two
central assumptions regarding their subject. First, they have understood that
uniformity was a requisite of maritime law such that, generally speaking,
national, rather than state, law governed most maritime events and
transactions. Second, they have believed that in order to preserve the
uniformity of maritime law, federal admiralty courts are empowered to fashion
federal common law. 1 The commitment to these related propositions has been
attested to or illustrated by a collection of Supreme Court decisions. 2 For
instance, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 3 the case that stands as the
metaphor for the uniformity principle in admiralty, the Court said that federal
admiralty law would displace state law which “works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations.” 4

*

Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Tricia Fitzsimmons for her
able research assistance and, as always, to Mary Dougherty for her patient and precise secretarial
help. All shortcomings are my responsibility.
1. See e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part
II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 555-68 (1997) [hereinafter Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II)].
2. See e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239
(1942).
3. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
4. Id. at 216.
1337

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1338

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1337

More recently, these two tenets have come under attack. Although the
Supreme Court has not abandoned them, several recent opinions sound the
ominous notes of retreat. In American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 5 for instance,
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, disparaged Jensen as “just as
untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York . . .
would be in a case under the Due Process Clause.” 6 Comparing something to
Lochner is a lot closer to fighting words than to a compliment. The Court
declined Justice Stevens’ invitation to abandon Jensen but in terms that gave
little comfort to Jensen’s defenders. Justice Scalia thought it “inappropriate to
overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation.” 7 He
proceeded to define the “characteristic features” prong of Jensen so narrowly
as to drain it of use. 8
Moreover, some thoughtful scholars of federal courts have recently
challenged these suppositions as constitutionally unsound. Professor Martin
Redish writes, for instance, that the Supreme Court should abandon any notion
that admiralty courts can fashion federal common law in admiralty. The
constitutional basis for such activity, he argues, “is subject to doubt.” 9
Professor Bradford R. Clark argues that the Jensen uniformity principle is
“difficult to square” with the text of the Constitution and with the principle he
finds in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 10 that Article III judicial power to decide a
case does not confer the power to fashion federal common law. 11 More
recently, Professor Ernest Young has taken broad aim at these admiralty
chestnuts, firing a battery of ammunition to perforate the constitutional status
of the related uniformity and federal common law-making principles. 12
There should have been little doubt that the phenomenon of federal
common law-making in admiralty was not only a central preoccupation of
admiralty scholars, but was also of interest to those thinking about, and
teaching, the subject of federal courts. After all, leading federal courts
casebooks include generous maritime readings on the subjects, 13 and scholars
5. 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
6. Id. at 458.
7. Id. at 447 n.1.
8. Id. at 447-50. I have criticized Justice Scalia’s discussion. See Goldstein, Wilburn Best
(Part II) supra note 1, at 588-89 and n.469.
9. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 140 (2d ed. 1990).
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1245, 1332 (1996).
12. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1998).
13. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 334-35 (4th ed.
1990); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 791-801 (4th ed. 1996); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL
COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 894-901 (4th ed. 1998); LOUISE WEINBERG,
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in the field have occasionally contributed a leading article on the subject. 14
The discussions by Professors Redish, Clark and Young made even more
evident that the subject, far from being the proprietary right of admiralty
scholars, is very much shared turf. The direction of these revisionist
discussions may have caused some consternation, even pain, among maritime
scholars. But the power of the assaults caused many maritime scholars to
consider the constitutional merit of federal common law-making in admiralty,
an enterprise, in reliance on a number of Supreme Court opinions, 15 they had
long assumed.
In some sense, it is not surprising that some federal courts scholars would
reach conclusions so different from their admiralty colleagues. Those
committed to studying the authority of federal courts naturally read a different
literature than do maritime scholars. Scholars of federal courts direct their
attention to general maritime law as a species of, and to discern trends in,
federal common law generally. Admiralty scholars, however, focus on general
maritime law as the source of much substantive maritime law. The central
issue of many courses on federal courts—-the constitutional basis, implications
and limits of federal judicial power—-leads one naturally to consider the
propriety of federal common law, including its prime species, general maritime
law. Admiralty scholars, however, focus on general maritime law largely for a
different reason: it is the source of much of the substance of the course they
teach. Thus, as Professor Force points out, much of the admiralty law
concerning collisions, personal injury, towage, general average, and salvage, is
based upon federal judge-made law. 16 For maritime scholars, federal common
law in admiralty is simply a fact; regardless of how one weighs that fact as a
constitutional argument, it has implications for the way commercial shipping
works and the way maritime scholars think.
Finally, the competing approaches to the subject may have something to do
with the different way Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 17 enters the respective courses.
In Federal Courts courses, Erie enjoys a leading role (except in those courses
where the professor dares not retrace the path students resisted in Civil
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 8398 (1994).
14. In addition to those recently offered by Professors Redish, Clark and Young, see e.g.,
David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 SUP. CT. REV.
158 (1960).
15. See e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997); McDermott,
Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994); East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
16. Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1367 (1999).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Procedure). There it addresses the allocation of power between federal and
state government, and between legislature and courts; the existence of an
Article III grant of judicial power is insufficient to confer federal common lawmaking competence. In Admiralty courses, Erie appears as something of a
foil, a pedagogical technique to help students understand how courts decide
what law to apply to a particular transaction. Cases like Jensen and Chelentis
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co. 18 established that “the general maritime law’s
limitations on recovery prohibited the application of the state tort laws.” 19 In
essence, general maritime law displaced state law not simply in federal courts,
but in state courts, too. Jensen and Chelentis suggested that the substantive
law to apply should not vary with the litigant’s choice to invoke federal or state
jurisdiction. As such, they stood for the same anti-forum shopping principle
Erie announced—-and two decades earlier!
The arguments of Professors Redish, Clark and Young also suggested that
perhaps some dialogue among interested scholars from the admiralty and
federal courts communities would be productive. Although admiralty and
federal courts scholars have navigated these common channels, they have
rarely met midstream to share their varying perspectives. At the 1999 meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools, the Maritime Law Section
sought to begin a conversation. Its program, Federal Common Law in
Admiralty, featured presentations by two leading maritime law scholars,
Professor Robert Force, the Niels F. Johnson Professor of Maritime Law and
Director of the Tulane Maritime Law Center and Professor Steven F. Friedell
of Rutgers-Camden, and by Professor Young, now an Assistant Professor of
Law at the University of Texas Law School, a leading new critic of general
maritime law. Whereas Professors Force and Friedell both are committed to
some role for federal courts in shaping federal common law in admiralty,
Professor Young forcefully denies the constitutionality of that exercise.
The papers which follow consist of elaborations of the presentations
Professors Force, Friedell and Young made to begin that conversation. The
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL is pleased to provide these rich
discussions that suggest some of the competing points on one of the most
pressing contemporary issues in admiralty law.
In addressing this issue, Professors Force, Friedell and Young draw upon
deep understandings of their subject to offer interesting insights on many
relevant areas of admiralty and federal courts law. Their papers cogently
deploy different types of constitutional arguments 20 to address the question.

18. 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
19. David Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Law After Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 88 (1996).
20. For discussions of different modes of constitutional argument, see PHILLIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); NORMAN REDLICH ET
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Professor Young does not keep his readers in suspense regarding his
bottom line; his title, which declares the “Unconstitutionality of Preemptive
Federal Maritime Law,” trumpets his conclusion. Although Professor Young
believes that originalist arguments impeach, rather than support, the case for
federal common law in admiralty, his argument does not lean on the framers’
intent. Instead, Professor Young believes the problem stems from Jensen
which allows maritime law to displace state law whenever admiralty
jurisdiction exists. Jensen represents then a relic of the rejected Swift v.
Tyson 21 era, a holdover of the general federal common law that Erie discarded.
Professor Young’s argument proceeds from the principle of judicial federalism
he extracts from Erie, sort of a hybrid of two of the Constitution’s central
structural principles, federalism and the separation of powers. Erie tells us,
Professor Young argues, that federal “courts have no power to go first in
making federal law.” 22 The fact that the federal government may have power
to regulate an area does not justify the federal courts in creating regulations.
For under Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 23 “the
separation of powers principle that only Congress makes federal law protects
federalism as well, by channeling lawmaking decisions into the institution
where the States are represented directly.” 24 However, when federal courts
fashion federal common law independent of any statutory authorization or
guidance, as is often the case in admiralty, the political safeguards of
federalism are missing. Admiralty courts see it as their mission to provide a
judge-made rule to address questions which Congress has not answered. In so
doing, Professor Young believes they violate constitutional arrangements. The
empty space Congress leaves in federal law should not invite federal judicial
activity. Rather, it signifies Congress’ inability to achieve consensus on a
national rule, thereby implicitly leaving the matter to the states. Current rules
of legislative preemption recognize this principle, Professor Young suggests.
They require a clear statement of Congressional intent to preempt state law.
Yet federal common law-making activity “almost always does preempt state
law even though Congress has never acted at all.” 25
Unlike Professor Young, Professors Friedell and Force believe that the
Constitution empowers admiralty courts to engage in federal common law and

AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-4 (2d ed.1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1987).
21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
22. Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and
the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1349, 1353
(1999).
23. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. Young, supra note 22, at 1353.
25. Id. at 1357.
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that such activity is beneficial. Professor Friedell understands the current law
to allow federal courts to fashion maritime common law except where states
have a paramount interest. He argues that this resolution is appropriate. After
canvassing various possible resolutions, essentially he invokes two types of
constitutional arguments to justify this activity. First, Professor Friedell relies
on “our history that recognized a large role for the federal courts and for
Congress to play in shipping matters.” 26 Professor Friedell relies implicitly on
two sorts of historical arguments—the substantial body of judicial doctrine that
recognizes a role for federal courts in fashioning admiralty law and the ability
of governmental institutions to shape constitutional meaning by engaging in a
pattern of activity that gains acquiescence over a long enough period. Second,
Professor Friedell makes a prudential argument. “I do not think this issue can
be resolved as a matter of logic,” he writes. 27 And he is skeptical that we can
identify “a single verbal formula” to address all issues. 28 In some areas (the
wrongful death cases, for instance), federal common law may have left a mess,
but it is a mess that federal common law can clean up. Moreover, Professor
Friedell believes flexibility offers some advantage, particularly in allowing
courts freedom to give appropriate weight to federal and state interests on an
issue-by-issue basis.
Like Professor Friedell, Professor Force does not believe that the logic of
Erie is necessarily transferable to, or dispositive of, the question presented
here. “I start with the premise that not every controversy regarding ‘federal
common law’ is susceptible of resolution by way of a single theory or
formula.” 29 While he gives constitutional text and history their due, he also
believes “that practical realities of particular circumstances should be given
some weight.” 30
Whereas Professor Friedell concentrates his defense of federal common
law on a limited number of modes of constitutional argument, Professor Force
deploys an array of constitutional arguments to bolster the practice. Professor
Force invokes originalism, citing historical evidence that the framers intended
uniform maritime law to govern private maritime law matters. He relies on
ongoing history and judicial doctrine to bolster his position; “[t]he arguments
for restricting the scope of the general maritime law have been considered and
rejected for nearly two centuries.” 31 Federal common law facilitates
uniformity of maritime law, a necessity for the operation of maritime
commerce. Far from undermining federalism, Professor Force emphasizes
26. Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse Nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1389, 1392 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Force, supra note 16, at 1377.
30. Id. at 1378.
31. Id.
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“the various ways” maritime law “accommodates the interests of
federalism.” 32 To be sure, Professor Force believes that the Supreme Court
“has failed to develop well-calibrated rules delimiting admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction that sufficiently balance national and local interests” and “has
failed to develop conflicts of laws rules, which are particularly essential in
cases which fall only marginally within federal admiralty jurisdiction.” 33 In
this regard, Professor Force joins Professor Young in subjecting “the infamous,
much maligned Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen case” to heavy criticism. 34
Unlike Professor Young, Professor Force does not see the enterprise of federal
common law-making as inherently flawed but simply mishandled on occasion
by the Court and misunderstood more often by its critics.
Professors Friedell and Force invoke on-going history to justify their belief
that admiralty courts act constitutionally in fashioning federal common law.
Professor Young does not dismiss the relevance of on-going history in shaping
constitutional meaning. He would be prepared to accept as persuasive the
reliance Professors Friedell and Force place on this type of argument if he
thought the regime the evolutionary approach created was working. He
concludes, however, that “maritime preemption is broke.” 35 Therefore, it is
time to return to the drawing boards, he concludes, and the new picture should
be true to the architecture Erie sketches.
Professors Force, Friedell and Young have offered a rich sampling of the
range of constitutional arguments which might be marshalled on the subject.
Their contributions here, and elsewhere, merit reading and rereading. I cannot
resist the temptation to depart from my neutral role as host to offer a few
observations to the debate. Although these introductory comments precede
their fine papers in the pages of this Law Journal, in fact, my observations are
prepared after their discussions and with the benefit of them. I hope they will
forgive me for adding these brief comments.
I am already on record as advocating a fairly robust federal common lawmaking role for admiralty courts. 36 It therefore will come as no surprise that
my own conclusions are closer to those of my admiralty brethren, Professors
Force and Friedell, than to my federal courts colleague, Professor Young.
Although this is not the time or place for a full defense of the concept of
uniformity in admiralty and the related concept of federal common law-making
by admiralty courts, I would offer these skeletal points in addition to those
already set forth.

32. Id. at 1382.
33. Id. at 1384.
34. Force, supra note 16, at 1384.
35. Young, supra note 22, at 1361.
36. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part I), 28
J. MAR. L. & COM. 395 (1997); Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II), supra note 1.
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First, it seems to me that Professor Young’s effort to apply the logic of
Erie to the maritime context encounters a formidable obstacle. Erie may
suggest that a jurisdictional grant does not normally serve as a basis for
legislative or federal law-making competence. But there is considerable
evidence that the Court did not mean that rule to apply to admiralty. Justice
Brandeis, the author of Erie, had joined the Court’s opinion fourteen years
earlier in Panama RR. Co. v. Johnson 37 which construed the Article III
jurisdictional grant to admiralty courts to confer, too, legislative power on
Congress. Erie based the lack of federal common law-making power in part
on the lack of federal legislative power over diversity cases per se. Since
Johnson made clear that Congress had power to legislate on maritime matters,
admiralty courts need suffer no such disability. Moreover, during Erie’s sixty
plus years, the Court not only has failed to apply this Erie constraint to
admiralty but has repeatedly reiterated, by word and deed, that federal common
law-making is routine in admiralty. Shortly after it decided Erie, the Court
reaffirmed its adherence to this activity in maritime matters. In Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 38 the Court ruled that general maritime law, and not state
common law, governed a maritime personal injury claim regardless of whether
the case was brought on admiralty, diversity or under some other basis of
jurisdiction. The Court’s premise in Pope v. Talbot—-that the jurisdictional
grant in admiralty conferred federal common law-making powers—-signalled
that the Erie limitation did not apply at sea. 39 If admiralty were to operate
under the same limitations, surely the Court would have said so.
My second quick hit relates to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 40 where the Court held that federal courts need not police the extent
to which Congress could apply to the states laws that were generally applicable
to private parties. 41 Since Congress consisted of the representatives of the
states, the political process would safeguard states’ rights. The rationale of
Garcia, Professor Young suggests, impeaches federal common law-making,
which displaces state law without any political protection for the states. I am
glad that Professor Young shares my admiration for Garcia. It seems odd,
however, to invoke Garcia these days to vindicate federalism. Some of those
now in command of a five-justice federalism majority on the Court castigated
Garcia when it was decided 42 and have chipped away at it ever since then. 43 I
37. 264 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1924).
38. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
39. Professor Young discussed this point in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 12, at
310-12.
40. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
41. Id. at 546-47.
42. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting likelihood of future overruling of
Garcia); Id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
43. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 119
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should have thought that few decisions were so vulnerable. In recent years the
Court increasingly has claimed a role in protecting the states from remedies
conferred by generally applicable laws. 44
I would be delighted if Garcia has more vitality than I understand. But if
Garcia retains its vigor, I think it adds little to the argument against federal
common law-making in admiralty; indeed, I believe it may cut the other way.
First, the issues at stake here differ from that in Garcia. In Garcia, the Court
declined to find any judicially enforceable constitutional protections for the
states from generally applicable statutes. 45 Here, the issue is not whether states
have any constitutional immunity from generally applicable commercial
statutes, but rather whether on occasions federal common law can displace
state law. To the extent the issues are analogous, the political process rationale
of Garcia essentially does operate under the current approach in maritime
matters. When admiralty courts fashion maritime common law, they create
law subordinate to federal legislation. If Congress, as the representative of the
states, believes state prerogatives compromised, it can overturn the federal
common law. If Congress believes its turf has been invaded, it can respond.
In other words, federal common law in admiralty presents a small threat to
state law in part because Congress, the states’ protector, can always trump it.
Just as Congress can rescind the extension to the states of a generally
applicable law, so, too, it can reverse any federal common law rule that
oppresses state interests.
To be sure, there is a difference. Outside admiralty, law does not apply to
the states unless Congress says it does; a federal maritime common law rule
might displace state law without legislative action. But this difference is, I
think, rather trivial and inconsequential. Federal judges are not lunatics who
cavalierly submerge treasured state interests in an ever-expanding sea of
general maritime law. On the contrary, they act pretty cautiously in
promulgating federal common law in admiralty. The amount of state law
displaced is relatively tiny. The practice is to accommodate important state
interests where possible, unless outweighed by some national imperative. 46
Surely the same federal judges who strike down congressional legislation
imposing federal duties on the states or subjecting states to remedies in federal
or state courts can be trusted to act judiciously in fashioning federal common
law, especially since they know their action is subject to legislative override. 47
S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999).
44. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 43; REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 67-70; Id. at 1-8 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
45. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-56.
46. See e.g. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-42 (1961).
47. Professor Young has addressed some of these issues in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra
note 12, at 333-341.
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I value slightly the displacement of state law that takes place in the real
world of admiralty decisions. But even if one assigns this cost greater weight,
it still must be measured against an important structural or prudential argument
in favor of federal common law-making in admiralty which is often
overlooked. In admiralty, federal courts address basic common law subjects
that in other contexts are routinely the province of the state courts. In
fashioning federal common law, the Supreme Court typically displays
sensitivity to the wisdom culled through the common law process by the state
courts. It often considers and distills the best of the state court treatments of a
subject in fashioning a federal admiralty rule. 48 Having done so, the rule
announced may be binding on federal and state courts dealing with admiralty
matters but otherwise lacks imperative force. Still, the Court’s consideration
of common law subjects in an admiralty context may advance the common law
by offering the state courts non-binding examples of how an institution with
the extraordinary human resources of the Supreme Court might treat these
problems. The state courts are not bound to follow the Court’s maritime
pronouncements outside of an admiralty context, but they may do so if they are
persuaded. In this way a conversation occurs between the state and federal
courts on the proper treatment of common law issues (which enriches the work
of both). 49
To be sure, neither the Court nor the academic community can claim
anything close to perfection in addressing admiralty matters. But the deficit is
often due to the difficulty of the problems, not any lack of skill of those
addressing them. Moreover, admiralty is not the only area where the Court,
and those of us who study it, fall short. On balance, the federal courts have
contributed a great deal in their work fashioning general maritime law, both in
solving admiralty problems and offering examples of common law reasoning.
I tend to think the wrongful death area is less a mess than Professor Friedell
suggests. 50 But it is not near the mess that has occurred when the Court has
left crucial areas of maritime activity to the vagaries of state law. Witness the
48. See e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
(relying on better common law approach; citing numerous common law decisions).
49. Professor Young addresses this point in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 12, at 342
n.451.
50. In my view, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), was a masterful
and wholly appropriate exercise of federal common law-making in which Justice Harlan, for a
unanimous Court, recognized a judge-made federal wrongful death remedy. In so doing, he
eliminated several anomalies in maritime law consistent with congressional policies. The misstep
occurred in Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), where the Court went beyond
congressional policies, basically by adopting as the federal rule the evolving “better” state rule.
Other wrongful death cases essentially adhere to congressional limits. Other than Gaudet, the
Court’s decision in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), is troubling in its
distinction between seafarers and nonseafarers and some of its dicta that questions prior decisions
setting federal standards to guide primary behavior.
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sorry state of the law of marine insurance resulting from the Court’s disastrous
decision in Wilburn Boat. 51
Finally, Professor Young’s call to give Jensen “a good strong push” over
the precipice sends me scurrying to move it to safer ground. Although
Professor Force prescribes a different remedy for Jensen, like Professor Young
he is clearly not a fan or even a supporter of Jensen. They are not alone in
their conclusions. 52 Jensen is, of course, far from perfect; who would, after all,
expect perfection from Justice McReynolds? The decision (denying relief via
a state compensation statute to the family of an essentially localized decedent)
was wrong, the analysis wooden, the language failed to soar. Yet at the risk of
triggering a chain of knee-slapping hilarity among Jensen’s formidable critics
(“Did you hear what that moron Goldstein said?”), let me defend as correct
Jensen’s two fundamental insights—-that maritime law should generally be
uniform federal law (which implies a substantial federal common law role) and
that the law to be applied in maritime transactions should not vary with the
jurisdiction plaintiff invokes. These principles have been omnipresent (even if
not brooding) in admiralty for decades. 53 Hopefully they will remain so. To
explain why will require a longer discussion than I can now afford in this no
longer brief introduction to the fine work of Professors Force, Friedell and
Young. In any event, Jensen is the topic of the AALS maritime program in
2000. Tune in.

51. See Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II),supra note 1, at 556-58.
52. See e.g., GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 642
(1975) (describing Jensen as one of two most ill-advised Supreme Court admiralty decisions);
David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325, 332 (1995) (“The
present era of admiralty federalism will not end until we are free from Jensen’s fading but still
visible shadow.”).
53. This is not to say that strong state interests should not be accommodated where so doing
does not interfere with some weighty federal interest. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S.
731, 739 (1961). Indeed, Jensen seems to allow for this.
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